Contracts - Defense to Third Party Beneficiary Rights Not Available under Collective Bargaining Agreement in Absence of Express Provision - Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 80 S.Ct. 489 (1960) by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 9 
Issue 2 Spring-Summer 1960 Article 16 
Contracts - Defense to Third Party Beneficiary Rights Not 
Available under Collective Bargaining Agreement in Absence of 
Express Provision - Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 80 S.Ct. 489 
(1960) 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Contracts - Defense to Third Party Beneficiary Rights Not Available under 
Collective Bargaining Agreement in Absence of Express Provision - Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 80 S.Ct. 
489 (1960), 9 DePaul L. Rev. 264 (1960) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol9/iss2/16 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tence was imposed for the last crime. While forgery was the only crime
charged there, the court failed to enter a specific term for it and the life
sentence was allowed to stand. The logical inference from Witte is that
the court recognized the double sentencing aspect of §9-2209 of the Act
to be a procedural implementation of §9-2208 and not as determinative of
substantive rights. The imposition of separate sentences does serve to em-
phasize the disparity between the punishment accorded habitual criminals
in Indiana and that accorded first or second offenders. First or second of-
fenders would, of course, receive only the specific term and not the life
sentence.
Another constitutional attack on an habitual criminal statute is thus
repulsed. It is felt here that these statutes are vincible only by repeal. And
repeal is incomprehensible unless and until legislators begin to doubt the
punitive and deterrent values of long-term imprisonment.
CONTRACTS-DEFENSE TO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
RIGHTS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT IN ABSENCE
OF EXPRESS PROVISION
The United Mine Workers of America entered into a collective bar-
gaining contract with nine coal operators, one of which was the Benedict
Coal Corporation. The agreement provided that a union welfare fund
was to be established and maintained from royalties on each ton of coal
produced by the corporation for sale or use. The trustees of the fund
brought suit as third party beneficiaries for a portion of the royalties
which the corporation failed to pay under the collective bargaining
agreement. The Benedict corporation cross-claimed for a larger amount
as damages sustained from strikes and stoppages by the union in violation
of the collective bargaining contract, and claimed that payment to the
welfare fund was excused in proportion to the violation of the agreement
by the union. The jury returned a verdict for the trustees, but also found
in favor of the corporation on the cross-claim. The district court gave
effect to Benedict's defense by refusing immediate execution and payment
of interest on the trustees' judgment. Instead, it ordered that the judgment
be satisfied only out of the proceeds collected by Benedict on its judg-
ment against the union and paid into the registry of the court by the
union.
Both the union and trustees prosecuted separate appeals to the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court, except that it held the amount of the damages awarded to
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Benedict on its cross-claim to be excessive.' The United States Supreme
Court, on certiorari, modified the judgment in favor of the trustees to
allow immediate and unconditional execution and interest, on the full
amount of the trustees' judgment. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation,
80 S.Ct. 489 (1960).
Since the time of Lawrence v. Fox,2 the third-party beneficiary has
been allowed to sue on a contract as if he were a party to the contract.
Such action does not, however, change the contract rights or equities
between the original parties.3 One of these rights is that of set-off. 4 The
third-party beneficiary has been thought of as standing in the shoes of
the promisee. 5 The established principle is stated in the Restatement of
Contracts at Section 140, that is, upon the:
[P]resent or prospective failure of the promisee to perform a return promise
which was the consideration for the promisor's promise, the rights of a donee
beneficiary or creditor beneficiary under the contract is subject to the same
limitations.6
The Supreme Court in the instant case has concluded that the principle
quoted above rests upon the logical inference of "an intention of the
promisor and promisee that the third party's rights be so limited."'7
Benedict involves a third-party beneficiary contract which is not typical,
and in which no intent to limit can be inferred. First, the corporation's
interest in the trust fund established under the Taft-Hartley Act' is equal
1 "The judgment in favor of the trustees will then be amended by the district court
to allow execution and interest on that part of the said judgment which is in excess of
the set-off in favor of Benedict as so redetermined." Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corpora-
tion, 259 F.2d 346, 355 (C.A. 6th, 1958).
220 N.Y. 268 (1859). Massachusetts, Exchange Bank of St. Louis v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37
(1871) and England, Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B.&S. 393 (K.B., 1861) do not follow
Lawrence v. Fox.
3 Rouse v. United States, 215 F.2d 872 (C.A.D.C., 1954); Gennett v. Smith, 278 N.Y.S.
478 (1935).
4 Cf. Kynes v. Clark, 29 F.2d 545 (C.C.A.8th, 1928), in which the court stated: "It is
a general rule that the grantee who has assumed and agreed to pay a mortgage indebt-
edness when sued on such contract by the mortgagee or one claiming under him may
set up any defense which he could assert against an action on such contract by the
promisee, his grantor." Ibid., at 546, 547.
5 McLean Construction Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 168 F.Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo.,
1958). "It is clear that plaintiff, as third party beneficiary, has no more rights under the
contract than Brown, and that any defense available to Globe so far as Brown is con-
cemed, is equally available to it with McLean." Ibid., at 321. Accord: Fulmer v. Gold-
farb, 171 Tenn. 218, 101 S.W.2d 1108 (1937); Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N.Y. 30 (1881).
6 Consult: Williston, Contracts, § § 394, 395 (stud. ed. rev., 1938); 4 Corbin, Contracts
§§ 819, 822 (Supp., 1959).
7 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 80 S.Ct. 489, 494 (1960).
8 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 302(c) (5), 29 U.S.C.A. S 186(c) (5)
(Supp., 1959).
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to the interest of the union, since they have an equal responsibility of
administration. Second, the trust fund is an additional form of compensa-
tion to the employees, similar in nature to wages. Thus, protection of
the trust fund is of concern to both promisor and promisee, and in the
absence of an express provision therefor, the Court will not infer an
intention to protect the promisor corporation.
This is especially so, according to the Court, in view of the fact that
the Benedict contract is an industry-wide agreement. An intention to
thus protect the promisor would require that the "parties to the agree-
ment were willing to risk the threat of diminution of the fund in order
to protect those of their number who might have become involved in
local labor difficulties."9
Considerations of "National Labor Policy" are further employed by
the Court to distinguish the Benedict contract from an ordinary third-
party beneficiary contract. Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act pro-
tects individual members from liability for a money judgment rendered
against the union.10 The same policy, reasoned the Court, would seeming-
ly dictate that the member beneficiaries of the welfare fund be protected
from the penalties incurred by union conduct, which in this case would
be the right of the corporation to refuse to contribute to the fund.
Perhaps this decision must be most accurately viewed as promulgating
a principle belonging to a newly emerging body of law fashioned for
the purpose of enforcing collective bargaining agreements. Section 301 (a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act grants federal jurisdiction over collective bar-
gaining agreements." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills12 held that
Congress anticipated that the courts would provide "some effective
method of assuring freedom from economic warfare,""a obviously the
most effective method being the power of a district court to decree
specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate a grievance dispute.
9 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 80 S.Ct. 489, 495 (1960).
10Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301(b), 29 U.S.CA. S 185(b) (Supp.,
1959) provides: "Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court
of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and
against its assets and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his
assets."
11 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, S 301 (a), 29 U.S.C.A. S 185 (a) (Supp.,
1959) .provides that: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this cha ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court or the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
12353 U.S. 448 (1957).
18 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. p. 16, quoted in Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
454 (1957).
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Justice Frankfurter had dissented in Lincoln Mills, expressing a fear of
the legislative power exercised by virtue of "judicial inventiveness" 14
creating a body of law peculiar to collective-bargaining agreements. Jus-
tice Frankfurter dissented again in Benedict, stating that Section 301 (b) of
the Taft-Hartley Act specifically protects individual members from money
judgments rendered against them solely by "virtue of their union mem-
bership,"' 5 while Section 302(c) (5) of the same Act was passed to insure
that welfare agreements be couched in specific terms assuring receipt of
the benefits by union members.'6
In conclusion, Justice Frankfurter fails to find any justification, either in
the nature of the agreement or in legislative policy expressed in the Taft-
Hartley Act for "jettisoning principles of fairness and justice"' 7 applicable
to all contracts. In his view a "new law of collective bargaining agree-
ments"' 8 has been created.
14 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957). Justice Frank-
furter's opinion that S 301 is a strictly procedural provision is set out in great detail in
Employees v. Westinghouse Corporation, 348 U.S. 437, 441 to 449, 452 to 459 (1955).
15Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 80 S.Ct. 489, 497 (1960).
iSJustice Frankfurter quotes at 498 from Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419
(1959).
17 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 80 S.Ct. 489, 498 (1960).
18 As was prophesized in Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, in Collective Bargaining and the Law (Univ. of Mich. Law School), pp. 121-
122, and quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Benedict at 498, 499.
CONTRACTS-UNIQUE TRI-PARTY PROMISE: "I PROMISE
THAT X WILL DRAIN THE MARSH"
HELD BINDING
Plaintiff was in the market for a new home. A real estate salesman di-
rected him to a lot fronting on a marsh. The salesman assured plaintiff
that the original developer of that area intended to convert the marsh
into a lake and that the realty company was "going to see it was done"
because the company owned other lots in the vicinity. Similar assurances
came from Barcroft Woods, Inc., owner of the lots in question, and de-
fendant in the ensuing litigation. Plaintiff and the real estate dealer both
testified that the original developer of the subdivision orally indicated his
firm intention that he would lower the marsh water. The developer denies
this.
All references to the anticipated lake culminated in provision for it in a
contract between defendant Barcroft Woods, Inc., and plaintiff purchaser,
for the sale of a lot improved by a newly constructed house and a forty-
foot beach. The contract provided: "It is further understood that the lake
